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Abstract 
Traditional farmer cooperatives, new generation farmer cooperatives, and 
investor-owned firms (IOFs), are compared regarding their value added and value 
added rate in terms of product marketing. The results of the analysis regarding the 
pear supply chain in Zhejiang province in China indicate that IOFs obtain a higher 
value added or value added rate than farmer cooperatives. New generation 
cooperatives mitigate the under-investment problem of traditional cooperatives in a 
certain extent. However, farmer cooperatives have some advantages over 
investor-owned firms in benefiting farmers. 
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  11. INTRODUTION 
Due to intensified market competition and the rising of supermarkets in the 
supply chain, it is becoming more difficult for small farmers in China to negotiate 
with others (HU and REARDON, 2004). Farmers often gain a limited share of value 
added of the entire supply chain. There are imbalances between sellers and buyers 
regarding the distribution of benefits and risk sharing in the product value chain. 
Farmers receive hardly a reasonable share compared to the risk they shoulder, due to 
their weak bargaining position. As a response to the perceived imbalance, 
organizations with different governance structures were established to help small 
farmers in some measure.   
Cooperatives and investor-owned firms (IOFs) are alternative governance 
structures of business organization that operate in the food supply chain. Governance 
structure is defined as the allocation of decision rights and income rights over relevant 
assets (HANSMANN, 1996). Here decision rights in the form of authority and 
responsibility address the question ‘Who has authority or control (regarding the use of 
assets)?’, while income rights address the question ‘How are benefits and costs 
allocated?’. Just as the name implies, investor owned firms are firms hold by investors, 
while cooperatives are characterized by member use and member control. An 
investor-owned firm is characterized by the objective of pursuing benefits 
maximization of investors holding the residual claims, while a cooperative is defined 
as an association of persons joining together to achieve a common objective (both 
profit related and non-profit related), and members have both a transaction and 
ownership relationship with the organization.   
Jonathan (1999) observes that farmer cooperatives, farmer associations and 
contracts with private agri-business companies all provide farmers with access to 
markets. But the difference in income right and residual right allocation between 
alternative governance structures contributes to the differences in organizational 
performance in terms of capital structure, profitability, operation efficiency, and 
growth rates, etc. There is a lot of literature regarding the comparison between these 
two forms of governance structures. Albaek and Scholtz (1998) develop a model of 
competition between a cooperative and an IOF, and show that the members of the 
cooperative will earn more than the vertically integrated profit per farmer generated in 
the IOF. Hendrikse (1998) constructs a screening model to determine the conditions 
and circumstances under which the cooperatives or the IOFs will be preferred or 
coexist. He argues that cooperatives are not efficient in accepting good project and 
show a lack of innovation. But the competition with cooperatives improves the market 
performance of IOFs and helps to prevent the inefficiency outcome or equilibrium of 
a market that consisting of IOFs only. Karantininis and Zago (2001) model the 
decision of farmers to join the cooperative versus the IOF. One of their conclusions is 
that inefficient producers tend to choose the cooperative instead of the IOF. Lacking 
from all these analyses is a value added efficiency differential between cooperatives 
and IOFs. In a practical study (CHEN, BABB, and SCHRADER, 1985), results that 
cooperatives have lower profitability, higher leverage, and higher growth rates than 
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study within the dairy industry, found that cooperatives have higher profitability and 
lower leverage than IOFs. Besides, they state that performance of cooperatives differ 
significantly across size and industry categories.   
As, from the point of view of farmers, a governance structure is applied to help 
farmers get access to markets and gain more, one of the most important prerequisites 
should be that it can gain a larger share of value in the chain. Huang (2005) and Liu 
(2004) point out that the development of organizational governance structures may 
help farmers to capture a larger share of the value added. A strong connection between 
the value added rate and the presence or development of governance structure form is 
seen, due to farmers’ decision to join a cooperative or transact with an IOF must be 
based mainly on economic terms (KARANTININIS and ZAGO 2001).   
We investigate the claim that there are significant differences in the value added, 
value added rate of products and the shares of value added that farmers gain between 
alternative governance structures. The main objectives of the study are to 
1) identify the differences in the product value added as well as value added rate 
between alternative governance structures.   
2) determine the key factors besides economical benefit that contribute to 
farmers’ choice of product outlet governance structure. 
3) address what can be done to help farmers to gain a larger share of value added 
in the chain. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the pear production in 
China. Section 3 reviews the literature, compares the three governance structures, and 
formulates propositions. Section 4 is dedicated to methodology. Results of testing are 
shown in section 5. Finally, discussions and recommendations for further research are 
formulated in section 6. 
2 PEAR PRODUCTION IN CHINA 
In order to control for industry or product category, a single product, pear, is 
selected. Pear is a main fruit in China, whose production is ranked third following 
apple and citrus (GEMMA, 2002). Pears for fresh consumption in China account for 
more than 90% of the national production, while those for processing account for less 
than 10% (SAITO, 2005). China is the largest pear producer in the world. Expansion 
in pear production is due to a combination of high profitability, increasing consumer 
demand, and improvement in technology (GEMMA, 2002). We can see fast growth in 
pear production in China from Figure 1 and market share expansion in global pear 
export in Figure 2. 
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Source: China Agriculture Statistical Yearbook (1999-2008) 
Figure 2: Shares of global pear export in 1999 and 2004 
 
Zhejiang province was selected as the province where the practical study was 
carried out mainly due to two reasons. The first is that Zhejiang is one of the main 
pear production as well as consumption provinces. Zhejiang province is not famous 
for the big yield of pear (see the yields and areas of pear production of Zhejiang in 
Table 1), but for the relative advantage on high quality variety, high level technique 
and high competitive market. 
  4Table 1: Pear production in Zhejiang province from 2003 to 2007 
Item/year  2003  2004  2005 2006 2007 
Area（1,000 hectares）  
22.1 24.1  25.7 26.6 26.5 
Yield  （tons） 
202,200 244,454  285,751 310,375 329,753 
Source: China Agriculture Statistical Yearbook (2004-2008) 
The other reason is that Zhejiang province is a leader in China in terms of the 
development of both farmer cooperatives and alternative agricultural organizations 
such as investor-owned firms. It is one of the provinces with the largest quantity of 
cooperatives, and the province leading the development of alternative organization 
forms in both agricultural and non-agricultural industries. The co-existence of 
alternative governance structures provides the possibility for a comparison. 
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Some concepts used in this article are defined in this section and a proposition is 
formulated based on a review. 
A governance structure specifies on the one hand who formally holds the 
decisions rights and on the other hand the way in which revenues and costs are 
distributed in terms of income rights (HANSMANN, 1996). In other words, an 
organization is characterized by authority and residual claims. The shareholders are 
the owners of an investor-owned firm, whereas all the members are the owners of a 
cooperative. The distinction between a shareholder and a member is that a shareholder 
provides only capital to the enterprise, whereas a member provides capital as well as 
inputs to the enterprise. 
The issue of economy effectiveness or efficiency regarding various governance 
structures or different ownership structures is theoretically studied by Hart and Moore 
(1996), Albaek and Scholtz (1998), Hendrikse (1998), Chaddad and Cook (2002), and 
Cook and Chaddad (2004), etc. 
In Hart and Moore (1996) paper, two claims concerning the relative efficiency 
comparison of member cooperatives and outside ownership are tested and confirmed. 
They conclude that outside ownership becomes relatively more efficient than a 
members’ cooperative as the variation across the membership becomes more skewed 
and as the transaction faces more competition Cooperative is defined as an 
organization that the assets are controlled by the members who hold control rights and 
residual rights, and outside ownership as an organization that the assets are controlled 
by an outside owner who maximizes profit. Market competition and member 
heterogeneity are the two dimensions emphasized to be the key factors in determining 
the choice of efficient governance structure. More competitive market environment 
and more heterogeneous interests lead to more preference of outside ownership. 
Chaddad and Cook (2002) propose a typology of organizational models, in 
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the new generation cooperative is deemed as a structure in between. They define the 
ownership rights as being comprised of residual claims and residual control rights. 
Herein residual claims are defined as the rights to the net income generated by the 
firm. Residual control rights are defined as the rights to make any decisions regarding 
an asset’s use that are not explicitly attenuated by law or contract (Grossman and Hart, 
1986). Characteristics of the residual claim rights distinguish organizational forms 
from one another (FAMA and JENSEN, 1983a, b). Shareholders of a firm hold the 
residual claim rights, while all the members of a cooperative are in charge of the 
residual claim rights.   
Farmer cooperatives can be distinguished into two main types: traditional 
cooperatives and new generation cooperatives. Cook and Iliopoulos (2000) 
characterize a traditional agricultural cooperative by open membership, growth capital 
primarily generated from patronage, illiquid ownership rights, residual claims 
between active and inactive members, and a one member one vote principle. Katz and 
Boland (2002) characterize a new generation cooperative by closed membership and a 
delivery requirement (which must be delivered under threat of sanctioning if members 
do not fulfill their obligation). 
Realities in China are in accordance with the theoretical classification. 
Nowadays in China there are both traditional cooperatives and new generation 
cooperatives, and probably some forms in between or in transition.   
According to Chaddad and Cook (2002) argument, ownership structure has an 
effect on organizational efficiency. The characteristics of a traditional cooperative, 
described as open membership, vaguely defined ownership rights, defensive purposes 
and residual right of control based on ‘one member, one vote’, lead to 
underinvestment and inefficiency (COOK and ILIOPOULOS, 2000). The open 
membership leads to the free-rider problem and the horizon problem, i.e. members 
can capture benefits from their investment only over the horizons of their expected 
membership, which causes short-term investment and/or underinvestment 
(VALENTINOV, 2007).    If property rights are not clearly defined or not secure, then 
owners will not invest great amounts in assets that they may lose with no 
compensation (MILGROM and ROBERTS, 1992). Cooperatives are firstly found to 
act collectively for defensive purposes - to depressed prices and/or market failure 
(COOK and ILIOPOULOS, 2000), which implies a passive attitude towards 
investment. 
Alternatively, a new generation cooperative is organized due to a more offensive 
attitude towards adding value to their assets (COOK and CHADDAD, 2004). Cook 
and Iliopoulos (2000) consider new generation cooperatives as being more interested 
in extracting rents from value added activities up- and down-stream in the food chain. 
They also predict that the clearly defined membership cooperatives with transferable 
and appreciable residual claims enhance members’ incentives to invest and return on 
investment, which probably brings about higher product quality and higher product 
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Obtained from literature reviewed above, here we conclude with the first 
proposition. 
Proposition 1:  Members of traditional cooperatives tend to under-invest in 
production and marketing activities, compared with those of new generation 
cooperatives. 
Chaddad and Cook (2002) consider IOF to be the most efficient form of 
organization, taking into consideration the difficulty in assets valuation. They deemed 
IOF as a demutualized form of cooperatives. As a result of demutualization, residual 
claim and control rights are reassigned among the firm’s stakeholders. This 
reassignment brings high efficiency due to focused assets shares and focused 
achieving goals. Herbst and Prufer (2007) argue that cooperatives will be preferable 
when the cost of collectively decision making is sufficiently low, while firms are 
optimal when there is tough competition as well as higher costs of collective decision 
making. Porter and Scully (1987) employ the frontier production function to assess 
scale, price, and technical efficiency differences between farmer cooperatives and 
non-cooperative firms and find that the non-cooperative firms dominate in efficiencies 
over cooperatives. Whereas the model of Herbst and Prufer (2008) argue that the 
efficiency of different organizations depends on the competitive environment and the 
decision making cost. Their model shows that a cooperative usually is the most 
efficient form when there is sufficiently low cost of collective decision making. Yet, 
firms are preferable to cooperatives as soon as decision making cost rises to an extent. 
In conclusion, they consider IOF to be an optimal organizational response to tougher 
competition and more costly internal decision-making process. Following these 
former statements, a higher efficiency of IOF is predicted due to the heightened 
competition in markets. 
Conclude from these above stated research, an increment of economic efficiency 
is implied, ranging from traditional cooperative, new generation cooperative, to 
investor-owned firm, which forms the second proposition. 
Proposition 2: There is an ascending in economic efficiency of organizations of 
different governance structures, ranging from traditional cooperative, new generation 
cooperative, to investor-owned firm. 
4. METHODS 
This section introduces a model as well as measurement of various variables 
(4.1). Then methods of data collection are addressed(4.2). Subsequently, hypotheses 
are formulated based on propositions and measurement (4.3). Finally, cases chosen 
are described (4.4). 
4.1 A model and measurement of variables 
Value chain is a model that describes a series of value-adding process. The value 
of the product, as well as the cost, is being accumulated in the process of production, 
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added as the added expenses occurring during the process from input purchasing to 
output sale. In the same sense, value added is recognized as the added value in the 
process from input (product) purchasing to product sale. For instance, the cost added 
of a product marketed by an IOF is the expense occurring during procurement, 
transportation, packing, storing, and marketing, etc. And the value added is the value 
differential between product purchasing price paid to farmers and sale price paid by 
downstream clients. What we investigate is the value added (economical profit) and 
cost added (investment) within the marketing enterprises, which are described in the 
bracket (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Products supply chain 
 
The purchase prices of products or production costs are viewed as the original 
value of products. Costs added of products occur as long as there are activities of 
transaction, transportation, packing, processing and marketing. Value added is greater 
than zero if the sale price is higher than the purchase price or production cost.   
Assume that there are three types of governance structures of farmers’ product 
outlet in markets, namely traditional cooperatives, new generation cooperatives, and 
IOFs. In this research, a traditional cooperative is associated with one organizing 
farmers to produce and market in a relatively loose way, while a new generation 
cooperative organizes farmers in a much tighter way, such as contract purchasing. 
Therefore two types of cooperatives, in line with theory (KATZ and BOLAND, 2002; 
COOK and ILIOPOULOS, 2000), are recognized by characteristics listed in Table 2. 
Cooperatives have two or more than two characteristics of traditional cooperatives are 
regarded as traditional cooperatives, while those have two or more than two 
characteristics of new generation cooperatives are supposed to be new generation 
cooperatives. 
Production   Processing 
Enterprises: 
Coop and IOF 
Farmers   Consumers 
Inputs 
consumption 
Products supply chain 
  8Table 2: Characteristics of traditional and new generation cooperatives  
  Traditional coops  New generation coops 
Membership   Open membership  Close or limited membership 
Product delivery    No delivery obligation  Delivery obligation 
Contract  No written contract  Written contract 
Define profits of the three organizations as  ( , , ) iii i cap   respectively, where 
 and   refers to the traditional cooperatives (the new generation 
cooperatives, the IOFs).   ( ) denotes the procurement price,   ( ) 
denotes the cost added before sale, and 
1, 2, 3 i  1 2,3) i   
ci 1, 2, 3 i  i a 1, 2, 3 i 
i p ( 1, 2, 3 i  ) denotes the sale price of pear of 
the three enterprises. Suppose that there is no deep processing in either of the 
organization, except for first-stage process like grading and packing, which is the 
actual situation of pear industry investigated. For the IOF,  3 p  is the sale price and 
 is the procurement price paid to farmers. Since a cooperative is an enterprise 
owned by farmers, the costs and profits of a cooperative are regarded as the joint costs 
and profits of all the members. Thus for the two cooperatives, 
3 c
i p  (i ) is the sale 
price and   ( ) is the production cost of members. The profit function of each 
product will be: 
1, 2 
i c 1, 2 i 
ii i i p ca    , where  1, 2, 3 i  . 
Let 
g
i v  and 
g





i   be the net value added and net value added rate. Then we get 
, 
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i vp  i c  i i i c a
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4.2 Sampling and data collection 
As introduced in section 2, we focus population of the study on organizations of 
various governance structures related to pear production and/or marketing in Zhejiang 
province, China. There are two rounds of case selection, in order to ensure the 
representativeness of selected cases. Firstly, four pear farmer cooperatives and two 
investor-owned firms were recommended by Provincial Agricultural Department of 
Zhejiang based on consideration of types and representativeness, choosing from the 
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the government of Zhejiang province. Semi-structure interviews were conducted with 
Managers or initiators of observations, using a questionnaire that covered all the basic 
information, such as data regarding costs, prices and sale channels of the case 
organizations. Semi-structure interview is chosen out of structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured interview because of its advantages in enabling interviewees to 
probe deeply, to solicit expansive responses, and thereby uncover previously hidden 
detail (BURGESS, 1982). Basic information in terms of firm foundation and 
developing course; costs and prices related to pear production, procurement, and sale; 
and developing prospect as well as challenges are collected. 
Subsequently, based on the different developing histories, scales, and modes, etc, 
an IOF (DFD company), a traditional cooperative (ZS cooperative) and a new 
generation cooperative (NNS cooperative) were chosen out of the four cooperatives 
and two IOFs as our target cases. All the three organizations can well reflect and stand 
for real situations and types of existing farmer related organizations. Finally, several 
random unstructured interviews were done with farmers who deliver products through 
or to the three selected case organizations, to ensure or test the information 
authenticity of first-hand data related to the case organizations. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
Based on the first proposition that members of traditional cooperatives tend to 
under-invest in production and marketing activities, compared with those of new 
generation cooperatives, hypotheses are formulated.   
Hypothesis 1: The traditional pear cooperative tends to under-invest in 
production, compared with the new generation cooperative, i.e. 1 cc 2  .  
Hypothesis 2: The traditional pear cooperative tends to under-invest in 
processing, compared with the new generation cooperative, i.e.  12 aa  . 
As to the second proposition, i.e. there is an increment in both value added and 
value added rate of organizations of different governance structures, ranging from 
traditional cooperative, new generation cooperative, to investor-owned firm, 
hypotheses are explicit.   
Hypothesis 3: The investor-owned firm has the highest value added or value 
added rate, followed by the new generation cooperative, and the traditional 
cooperative has the lowest value added rate, i.e.  321
g g vvv 
g
1
n  or  .    32
nn vvv 
4.4 Data coding and description 
Details of the three organizations are presented case by case in this part.   
(1) ZS pear specialized cooperative (traditional cooperative) 
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ZS pear cooperative was established in 2002 by 10 pear farmers, with a 
registered capital of RMB 500,000 and set assets of RMB 1,200,000. The number of 
its members reached 104 in 2007. ZS cooperative supplies inputs for all the members 
at wholesale prices. The cooperative purchases pears of all the local farmers, but with 
a priority to members. The cooperative graded pears and those not meeting the 
grading standard would be rejected. ZS cooperative sold pears in four channels, 
namely group consumption, supermarkets, wholesale market and peddlers coming to 
the cooperative. The sale proportions of the above-mentioned channels were 60%, 8%, 
10% and 22% separately. The cooperative’s total purchasing volume of pears from 
farmers was 1000 tons at an average price of RMB1.5 per kg. The data is summarized 
in Table 3. 
Table 3: Costs and values of coop 1   































Coop 1  1.328  0.202  1.5  -0.030
1 0.130  -0.023 
 
  (2) NNS pear specialized cooperative (new generation cooperative) 
Interviewee: Manager Zhou 
NNS cooperative was established by 10 farmers or shareholders in 2004 with a 
registered capital of RMB 520,000. Now it has 13 core members and 108 common 
members. Farmers who want to join the cooperative have to pay for the shares. NNS 
cooperative carried out production standards according to which all the pears of 
members were produced. The cooperative also purchased inputs for members at 
relatively lower prices. Besides, technique instructions and trainings were provided to 
members by technique able men or specialist from government departments or 
universities invited by the cooperative. NNS cooperative signs purchasing and sale 
contracts with members before harvest time. 60,000kg pears were contracted. Set 
production standards, prices, brands and packages were contained in the contracts. 
Table 4 presents the production cost, cost added and value added of NNS cooperative. 
                                                        
1  Although the net profit is minus, farmers still gain some profits because labor costs of farmers themselves are 
included in the production costs. 
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Coop 2  3.838  1.313  7.6  2.449  0.980  0.638 
 
  (3) DFD firm (IOF) 
Interviewee: General Manager Xu 
DFD firm was established in April, 2003 by five shareholders, with a registered 
capital of RMB 3,000,000 and permanent assets of RMB 8,700,000. Now DFD has an 
pear orchard of 4 hectare. Besides, the firm purchases pears from farmers of Local 
County in June, July and August. The pear yield of DFD in 2007 was 225 tons while 
the purchase volume is 650 tons, which means that the total sale volume in 2007 was 
875 tons. The sale channels were described as: group consumption (80%), and 
supermarkets (20%).  All the costs and benefits of pear production, purchasing and 
sale are listed in Table 5. 
Table 5: Costs and values of the IOF 































IOF  2.142  1.558 6.960 3.260  2.249  1.522 
 
5. RESULTS 
Comparisons between the production investments, marketing investments, and 
net values added of the two cooperatives are displayed in Figure 4. 
  12Figure 4. Production costs, costs added, and values added of the two coops 
 
We see from Figure 4 that coop2 (new generation cooperative) has definitely 
higher level investments in both production and cost added than coop1 (traditional 
cooperative). The big differences in investments lead to pear quality differentia and 
sequentially contribute to the significantly different levels of value added. Pears of 
coop2 are produced according to specific standards under the supervision of the 
cooperative, while pears of coop1 are produced in common standards without 
especially strict supervision from the cooperative. Besides, coop2 signs contracts with 
members with detailed items in terms of product quality standards, prices and delivery 
volume.  
Now we can conclude that the first and second hypotheses are confirmed, i.e. the 
traditional cooperative tends to under-investment in both production and marketing, 
while the new generation cooperative attaches more value to the quality of pear 
product to gain a higher price. 
Figure 5 denotes to the value added, both general and net, of the three types of 
organizations. 
  13Figure 5. Value added rates of the three organizations 
 
        The ascending in both general value added rate and net value added rate ranging 
from coop1, coop2, to the IOF, strongly confirmed the third hypothesis that the 
investor-owned firm and the traditional cooperative rank at the top spectrum and 
bottom spectrum respectively, and the new generation in the middle, with respect to 
value added rate. The value added of pears depends to a certain extent on the 
downstream buyers. As far as we know from the interviews, pears supplied to group 
consumption are generally of higher prices than those sold to either wholesaler or 
retailing stores. Another factor that contributes to the higher value added of the IOF 
should be the scale effect coming from diversification. The IOF grows and markets 
other fruits like oranges, plums and peaches, apart from pears. These different kinds 
of fruits share the same sale channels and also promote sale channels of each other. 
But cooperatives are more prone to focus on single product. 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESEARCHES 
Discussions concerning the implications of the tested results are addressed (6.1), 
and some further research questions are raised (6.2). 
6.1 Discussion 
The case analysis tests the proposition that traditional cooperatives are prone to 
under-invest, while new generation cooperatives are more interested in investment 
and investment return and IOFs are likely to have higher value added efficiency than 
cooperative. The result provides support for the perceived theories (COOK and 
ILIOPOULOS, 2000; VALENTINOV, 2007) that cooperatives of open membership, 
vaguely defined ownership rights, and defensive purpose are likely to have 
under-investment problem and low economy efficiency, and explicitly defined 
ownership contributes to higher economy efficiency. 
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an IOF usually has a significantly higher rate of value added than a cooperative. It is 
however puzzling from the perspective that farmer cooperatives are gaining speed in 
agro-food market. This phenomenon seems to contradict with standard economics 
theory that organization of low efficiency would be replaced by that of high efficiency. 
An explanation may be that farmer cooperatives have a lot of advantages over IOF, 
taking into consideration of farmers’ benefits. 
Firstly, the objectives of a cooperative and an IOF are different. An 
investor-owned firm aims at interest maximization of shareholders while a farmer 
cooperative pursues to maximize the benefits of all the members. Despite of the DFD 
firm’s higher investment efficiency, farmers can not gain a piece of the cake of the 
firm’s profit. In contrasts, profit of cooperative will be distributed among members 
equally or according to members’ transaction volume. 
Secondly, one of the key attributes of an organization lies in the decision making 
system. More active participation of members in decision making is expected in 
cooperatives due to the substantial financial stake in the cooperative by the members 
(HENDRIKSE and VEERMAN, 2001). This voice in decision making gives farmers 
preference in some measure over transaction with other organization forms. 
Thirdly, cost externalization serves as one of the factors that contribute to the 
survival and development of farmer cooperatives. Nowadays, farmer cooperatives in 
China are still at a take-off stage, which somehow determines the developing status of 
low investments level and low profitability. The government therefore supports the 
development of cooperatives through policies that externalize some costs of farmer 
cooperatives in the form of subsidies and preferential tax treatment. 
Last but not least, a cooperative is an organization owned and used by farmers. 
As far as we know, a sense of belonging is a necessity in our daily life, which is even 
reinforced because of farmers’ limited knowledge and preference in community 
participation. Farmer cooperatives are established on the basis of trust and culture. 
The trust between each member makes the dependence of farmers on cooperatives 
easier and stronger. 
The main lesson from the case study is that there is still a long way to go before 
farmer cooperatives in China survive and progress completely by themselves, and 
establish their own blood hematopoietic function and system, without subsidies and 
support from governments or donations. The trade-off is that cooperatives on the one 
hand behave as a benefit-maximizing firm in the big markets and on the other hand 
try to maintain the advantages of a cooperative as a farmer-controlled organization. 
Besides, the markets are undergoing changes of consumer interests and food 
consuming structures. Contract-production and systems of vertical co-ordination are 
replacing spot markets (MARTINEZ and REED, 1996). New generation cooperatives, 
who organize farmers in a relatively tight way, are prone to gain higher prices by 
ensuring product volume and quality of members.   
  156.2 Further research 
There are several directions for future research. First, this case study is limited by 
the size of the sample, which consists of 3 organizations. More observations are 
needed for further testing and analysis. Then statistical analysis can be applied to 
reach more general results. Second, the study is focused on the value added of product 
within organizational level. It is provoking to research on the whole map of value 
adding of each stage of the product supply chain. Thirdly, since new generations are 
usually supposed to be more efficient than traditional cooperative, there is scope for 
research investigating the question that will traditional cooperatives survive or 
transform to new generation cooperatives?   
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